"Regional Industrial Development" (CMND 9111, December 1983) by Ashcroft, Brian
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Ashcroft, Brian (1984) "Regional Industrial Development" (CMND 9111, 
December 1983). Quarterly Economic Commentary, 9 (3). pp. 86-90. ISSN 
0306-7866 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/51587/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
Briefing Paper 
"REGIONAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT" (CMND 9 1 1 1 , DECEMBER 1 9 8 3 ) 
by Brian Ashcroft , Department of Economics, Univers i ty of S t ra thc lyde 
The r e p o r t s or the death of regional pol icy were premature. Regional policy 
i s a l i v e , i f not w e l l , under the p r e s e n t Government. This i s c l e a r 
f o l l o w i n g t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of the Governments l o n g - a w a i t e d White Paper on 
reg iona l po l i cy : Regional Industrial Development (Cmnd 9111, December 1983.) 
The White Paper was expected to be the culminat ion of a review of regional 
pol icy which began in Ju ly 1979 under Sir Keith Joseph. Introduced severa l 
changes in t h e d e t a i l but m a i n t a i n e d the broad ph i losophy which has 
underpinned B r i t i s h reg ional policy s ince a t l e a s t the Industry Act of 1972. 
S u r p r i s i n g l y , the expected r ad i ca l changes have not m a t e r i a l i s e d . Instead 
we have a White Paper w i th "green edges" s u g g e s t i n g perhaps u n c e r t a i n t y 
and /o r a l a c k of consensus w i t h i n Government on how b e s t t o approach the 
reg iona l problem in t imes of severe , if se l f - imposed, f i n a n c i a l s t r ingency . 
In broad t e r m s , t h e Government i s p ropos ing to c o n c e n t r a t e r e s o u r c e s more 
c l o s e l y on a r e a s and communi t i es in need. In a d d i t i o n , the p r e s e n t 
s t r u c t u r e of reg ional i ncen t i ve s , p a r t i c u l a r l y regional development g r an t s , 
i s t o be a l t e r e d i n an a t t e m p t t o make i t more c o s t - e f f e c t i v e . 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , t he White Paper h e r a l d s a move t o a more d i s c r e t i o n a r y and 
l e s s a u t o m a t i c i n c e n t i v e s t r u c t u r e ; g r e a t e r emphas i s on job c r e a t i o n and 
l e s s on c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t per s e ; l e s s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t s e r v i c e 
i n d u s t r i e s and emphasis on l oca l job c rea t ion r a the r than job d ive r s ion . 
The Government hopes to achieve these ODJectives and a t the same time reduce 
p u b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e s on the p o l i c y . However, i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t the 
Government has y e t t o d i s c o v e r t he p h i l o s o p h e r s x s t o n e because t h e White 
Paper extends an i n v i t a t i o n to the publ ic to submit t h e i r views on de t a i l ed 
aspec t s of the pol icy . These inc lude : the c r i t e r i a for and coverage of the 
Ass is ted Areas: the balance between automatic and d i s c r e t i ona ry a s s i s t a n c e ; 
t h e r o l e of i n c e n t i v e s in c r e a t i n g new f i rms and l o c a l , J_°b3_j»nd__the 
ac 
Af 
autumn of t h i s year 
t i v i t i e s q u a l i f y i n g for and the r a t e s of, r e g i o n a l development g r a n t . 
t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n the Government hopes to take the f i na l dec i s ions in the 
This p e r s p e c t i v e examines in g r e a t e r d e t a i l the p r e s e n t Governmen t ' s 
approach to r e g i o n a l p o l i c y , t he r a t i o n a l e for change , the s p e c i f i c 
proposals and the l i k e l y outcome for Scot land. 
The case for regional pol icy 
The White Paper , not u n r e a s o n a b l y , c o n s i d e r s t h e e s sence o J i t i e s « 
problem to be "imbalances between areas in employment ° P P ° £ u n i t i e s . 
The imbalances remain because i n s t i t u t i o n a l and c u l t u r a l r i g i d i t i e s in 
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form or geographical wage-stickiness and immobility oi labour prevent the 
otherwise "natural adjustment of labour markets." (p3). Accordingly, the 
case for regional policy is seen principally as "a social one" (p4;, 
presumably to mitigate the effects of higher unemployment in depressed areas 
and the consequences to family life of the "forced" migration of those 
workers who do seek work elsewhere. 
The implied view of market efficiency in the absence of institutional 
rigidities accords well with what has come to be expected from the present 
Government in the pronouncements oi Ministers in other areas of economic 
policy. Yet, paradoxically, the White Paper does concede an economic case 
for regional policy but denies its current relevance. The argument that a 
regional policy diversion of labour demand will raise in some proportion to 
the jobs diverted, national employment and output is held to be inapplicable 
in conditions of general unemployment. However, to draw such a conclusion 
is to oversimplify a complex problem and ignores the academic work which 
suggests that an economic case for regional policy can still be made when 
unemployment exists in all areas. Moreover, it is faintly aosurd for the 
Government to argue on the one hand that freely-functioning labour markets 
adjust naturally, while on the other conceding an economic case for regional 
policy when the national pressure of demand is high. In these 
circumstances, when production in the prosperous areas of the UK ia 
constrained by labour shortages, regional incentives are only necessary to 
overcome the myopia of entrepreneurs who would other-wise ignore the more 
profitable production opportunities due to plentiful labour supplies in the 
Assisted Areas. Tnis is hardly "natural" adjustment. It is most unfortunate 
that the Government appears to place the responsibility for the failure of 
labour markets to adjust spatially on the labour force, while ignoring the 
role played by the inertia of companies. There is no evidence that the 
South or Britain is an aosoiutely more efficient location for given 
production activities, so there is no reason why workers and unions should 
be held solely responsible for the loss of output due to the failure of the 
labour market to adjust. 
Whatever the intellectual arguments, the fact remains that the Government 
currently perceives the rationale for regional policy to be purely social. 
In these circumstances the gross regional policy expenditures are viewed as 
being equal to the net cost to the Exchequer. The net cost would normally be 
lower when regional policy creates jobs in the nation, because the average 
new job increases tax revenues and lowers transfer payments. The pressure 
on Government to reduce the outlays on regional policy can be expected to 
increase when these savings in net outlays are absent. Table 1 shows the 
gross outlays to be £917 million at outturn prices in fiscal year 82-83 and 
the Government is forecasting a figure of £643 million on current policies 
in fiscal year 83-84. 
The policy proposals and the rationale for change 
The White Paper^s proposals do not stem simply from a perceived increase in 
the net Exchequer cost of regional policy. The present structure oi 
incentives is biased in favour of an automatic investment grant: the 
Regional Development Grant (RDG), payable for the provision of new assets 
for use on qualifying premises. To qualify for assistance the premises must 
be used for manufacturing and located in either Special Development Areas 
(SDAs) or simply Development Areas (DAs). The areas taken together cover 
27.5% of the working population in Great Britain and approximately 70% of 
the working population in Scotland. RDG is payable at a rate of 22? in 
SDAs and 15% in DAs. Table 1 shows that on average expenditure on RDGs 
accounted for about 72% of total outlays in GB over the period 77/8 to 82/3. 
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Table 1 : Regional Industrial Assistance, Great Britain and Scotland; 
Outturn Prices £m 
105 
393 
12 
44 
19 
52 
136 
489 
107 
417 
12 
104 
30 
85 
149 
606 
70 
331 
15 
78 
42 
110 
127 
519 
113 
491 
22 
74 
52 
141 
187 
706 
143 
617 
19 
76 
60 
161 
222 
854 
287 
690 
20 
90 
53 
137 
360 
917 
Fiscal Year 77-78 78-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 
1. Regional Development 
Grants : Scotland 
Great Britain 
2. Selective Financial 
Assistance: Scotland 
Great Britain 
3. Land and Factory 
Building:Scotland 
Great Britain 
Totals: Scotland 
Great Britain 
Scotland as % 
of Great Britain 28 25 24 26 26 39 
Source: Cmnd 9111 and Scottish Economic Bulletin, No 28 December 1983 
The main criticism of the RDG is that once the above criteria have been 
satisfied it is automatic, and payment is not directly related to job 
creation. Since the Government sees the regional problem to be a relative 
lack oi employment opportunities, a grant which is paid irrespective of job 
creation and whether the investment would have occurred anyway, can 
reasonably be considered to be a less than adequate policy instrument. 
This is brought home with some force by the scale of RDG payments in fiscal 
year 82/83 (Table M. Total RDG expenditures rose from £617 m to £690 m but 
perhaps more interestingly, the Scottish share of RDG expenditure jumped 
from 23% in 81/82 to 42% in 82/B3. Tnis jump can largely be accounted for 
by payments to large capital-intensive investments which probably would have 
occurred in the same locations anyway: £92 m to BP for the oil terminal at 
Sullom Voe and £19 m to Occidental of Britain Incorporated for oil-related 
developments in the Orkneys. Moreover, any expenditures that might result 
following the increased cash flow made possible by the grant would, in these 
and many other similar cases, be unlikely to benefit the specific local 
areas designated as being in need of assistance. Apart from these extreme 
cases, the estimated Exchequer cost of job creation under the present system 
has been running at about £35-£40,000 per job. A figure which the 
Government evidently feels to be too high. 
It was to be expected that the White Paper's main proposals would seek to 
tackle this particular problem. However, rather than following the ODVIOUS 
route of scrapping RDG and replacing it with a marginal labour subsidy, the 
White Paper proposes to retain the RDG but to alter the conditions under 
which the grant is given. Specifically, RDG Mark II would be an automatic 
grant payable on projects rather than assets, located on qualifying premises 
which either create new productive capacity or effect a change in a product, 
process or service. Tne areas in which the grant would be paid are subject 
to revision and the activities likely to be in receipt of the grant would be 
defined more broadly to include possibly ^mobile* services as well as 
manufacturing. Firms would receive a grant which would be the higher of 
either (a) a fixed amount £x for each new job created, or (b) a percentage 
of the investment outlays subject to an, as yet unspecified, £Y cost-per-job 
limit, where £y >£x. 
The move away from automaticity to greater selectivity is to be achieved by 
raising the proportion of expenditures on the present Selective Financial 
Assistance (SFA): a project-related grant paid with discretion subject to 
job creation and viability conditions. It is expected that the RDG Mark II 
will still constitute the main instrument of regional policy, even though 
theshareofSFAexpenditureswillrise. 
Implications for Scotland 
One cannot oi course preaict the effects of the proposals on Scotland with 
any certainty given that many aspects of the new policy are still to be 
decided. Yet, the broad lines of policy are clear and it is evident that 
there will be several effects on Scotland and, to confound the prophets of 
doom, not all or them harmful. 
It is important to be clear that regional policy does work. The most recent 
estimate of gross job creation quoted by the White paper is of approximately 
500,000 manufacturing jobs in the Assisted Areas of the UK over the period 
1961-1981. Scotland managed to obtain about one fifth of these jobs that 
would not otherwise have been located in the Assisted Areas. Two fifths of 
the jobs created in Scotland can be classified as indigenous; that is jobs 
created which were not directly associated with inward firm movement. It 
would, however, be a mistake to attribute these effects solely to the 
regional incentive structure, for two reasons. First, the pressure of 
demand in the national economy is important. It is estimated that regional 
policy was creating about seven to eight thousand jobs in manufacturing per 
year in the late 1960*s, but only about two and a half thousand jobs per 
annum in the late 1970*s. Most of the difference can be accounted for by 
differences in the national pressure of demand in the later period which was 
reinforced by the second reason: an active policy or IDC control in the 
late 1960's which was de facto abandoned in the late 1970"s because the 
xcosts* of possible lost investments were less easy to bear during a period 
of recession. The implication is that Scotland will benefit much more from 
regional policy once the national economy begins to climb out of recession. 
The proposed changes in the regional incentive structure will, in contrast, 
have a relatively marginal effect. 
The Government plan to try and reduce the scale of regional policy 
expenditures while at the same time providing some assistance to currently 
non-assisted areas, for example, the West Midlands which have suffered 
relative decline. Expenditures in Scotland are, other things equal, likely 
to be lower. Tnere will be several capital-intensive projects that will run 
up against the cost-per-job constraint but the investment will go ahead 
anyway, because a suitable alternative location will be absent. For these 
cases the loss of regional policy expenditures is largely immaterial. Howe 
ver, there will be other capital-intensive projects oi perhaps a more 
marginal nature that might not occur at all following the imposition of the 
cost-per-job constraint. Tne loss of these expenditures will materially 
affect the Scottish economy. The difficulty is in assessing the relative 
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p r o p o r t i o n s of t he two c a t e g o r i e s and e s t i m a t i n g i f t h e r e w i l l be any. 
r e l a t i v e l y l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e p r o j e c t s t h a t might not be v i a b l e under t he 
p r e s e n t i n c e n t i v e s t r u c t u r e but would be l i k e l y to go ahead under t h e new 
proposa ls . The l i k e l y r e s u l t i s t ha t t he re w i l l be a dec l ine in the number 
of j o b s c r e a t e d by t h e RuG in S c o t l a n d but a t a s m a l l e r r a t e than t h e 
dec l ine in RDG expendi tu res . The f i n a l pos i t ion on job c rea t ion w i l l depend 
on how e f f e c t i v e l y t h e S c o t t i s h Off ice dep loys i t s r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r 
c o n t r o l over r e g i o n a l p o l i c y now t h a t i t i s proposed t h a t the SFA should 
c o n s t i t u t e a g r e a t e r propor t ion of ove ra l l expendi tures . There i s some hope 
h e r e , g iven t h e l i m i t e d ev idence on the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of SFA, t h a t the 
S c o t t i s h Of f i ce might be a b l e t o use i t s i n c r e a s e d d i s c r e t i o n more to t h e 
bene f i t of Scot land, pound for pound, than would o therwise be the case with 
the RuG. I t i s , however, an open ques t ion , which ignores the ex t ra cos t s or 
admin i s t e r ing a more d i s c r e t i ona ry po l icy . 
I t i s t o be expected t h a t the d e s i r e to reduce expendi tures and concent ra te 
a id w i l l be to t he d e t r i m e n t of s e v e r a l a r e a s in S c o t l a n d . No d e c i s i o n s 
have been t a k e n , but t h e a r e a s most a t r i s k a r e t h o s e DAs wi th r e l a t i v e l y 
low unemployment r a t e s eg. Dunoon, Oban, Lochgilpead, Fa lk i rk , Kirkcaldy and 
Dunfermline. I t should be noted t h a t removal of Assis ted Area s t a t u s a lso 
p r e c l u d e s a c c e s s t o EEC r e g i o n a l a id as we l l as UK r e g i o n a l a i d . However, 
some a r e a s in S c o t l a n d might b e n e f i t compared wi th e l s e w h e r e because t h e 
White Paper p roposes to p l a c e a g r e a t e r weight on c r i t e r i a o t h e r than 
unemployment t o d e s i g n a t e A s s i s t e d Areas . Tnese i n c l u d e in p a r t i c u l a r 
remoteness from an economic cen t re and emigrat ion. 
The a b o l i t i o n of RDG payments to replacement investment which is necessary 
to bring B r i t a i n i n t o l i n e with the requirements of the European Commission, 
could be e s p e c i a l l y damaging for t he A s s i s t e d Areas and Sco t l and in 
p a r t i c u l a r . Many of the p ro j ec t s aided by regional policy in the l a t e 1960s 
and ea r ly 1970s are now coming to the end of t h e i r economic l i f e . Without 
the subsidy to un i t cos t s provided by RDGs for replacement investment , many 
of t h e s e companies may choose to r e l o c a t e p l a n t s back to t h e p a r e n t 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t abroad or in t h e South of England. One cannot p r e d i c t t he 
s c a l e of t h i s e f f e c t bu t i t c o u l d v e r y w e l l be g r e a t . T n i s i s n o t 
n e c e s s a r i l y to suggest t h a t Scotland w i l l be perceived to be an economically 
l e s s e f f i c i e n t l o c a t i o n . Ra the r , when t h e r e i s l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e in u n i t 
cos t s between areas the c u l t u r a l a t t r a c t i o n s of proximity to the met ropol i s 
a r e d i f f i c u l t t o r e s i s t . Moreover, in a r e c e s s i o n t h e heavy c o s t s of 
producing in more c e n t r a l l o c a t i o n s during periods of expansion and boom are 
often f o r g o t t e n . 
F i n a l l y , Scotland may gain some benef i t from a g r e a t e r emphasis on s e r v i c e s , 
e s p e c i a l l y i f t o u r i s m i s i n c l u d e d . However t he Government i s s u r e l y 
misguided in s e e k i n g t o r e s t r i c t t h e new i n c e n t i v e s t r u c t u r e to t h o s e 
s e r v i c e s which do not s e r v e l o c a l m a r k e t s and which a r e l i k e l y to be more 
m o b i l e . Local s e r v i c e s do not n e c e s s a r i l y depend on a g iven l e v e l of 
spending from income earned ou t s ide the area by other loca l sec to r s such as 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g . Spending can be i n c r e a s e d and l o c a l j obs c r e a t e d by 
r e d u c t i o n s in i m p o r t s and s a v i n g s . Moreover, t he l o c a l s e r v i c e j ob w i l l 
i t s e l f add t o l o c a l income and s p e n d i n g . Many manufac tu r ing a c t i v i t i e s 
serve l o c a l markets e.g. brewer ies and baker ie s , and the Government does not 
deny RDG payments t o t h o s e a c t i v i t i e s on t h e grounds t h a t i t e x p e c t s j o b s t o 
be d i s p l a c e d e l s e w h e r e in t he l o c a l economy. They should adopt the same 
s tance towards s e r v i c e s . 
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